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Legal Personality of Robots, Corporations, Idols and Chimpanzees: 1 
A Quest for Legitimacy  2 
  Abstract   3 
Robots are now associated with various aspects of our lives. These sophisticated 4 
machines have been increasingly used in different manufacturing industries and 5 
services sectors for decades. During this time, they have been a factor in causing 6 
significant harm to humans, prompting questions of liability. Industrial robots are 7 
presently regarded as products for liability purposes. In contrast, some commentators 8 
have proposed that robots be granted legal personality, with an overarching aim of 9 
exonerating the respective creators and users of these artefacts from liability. This 10 
article is concerned mainly with industrial robots that exercise some degree of self-11 
control as programmed, though the creation of fully autonomous robots is still a long 12 
way off. The proponents of the robot’s personality compare these machines generally 13 
with corporations, and sporadically with, inter alia, animals, and idols, in 14 
substantiating their arguments. This article discusses the attributes of legal 15 
personhood and the justifications for the separate personality of corporations and 16 
idols. It then demonstrates the reasons for refusal of an animal’s personality. It 17 
concludes that robots are ineligible to be persons, based on the requirements of 18 
personhood.  19 
Keywords: Legal Personality, Robots, Corporations, Idols, Chimpanzees 20 
Running Title: Legal Personality of Robots   21 
1. Introduction 22 
Robots have been slowly but steadily permeating our life in many respects, ranging 23 
from manufacturing industries to the administration of justice. Amongst their various 24 
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usages, the increase in the use of industrial robots (IRs or IR in singular) is perhaps 25 
most phenomenal. The International Federation for Robotics (IFR) in a 2015 report on 26 
IRs found an increase in the usage of robots by 29 percent in 2014, which recorded 27 
the highest sales of 229,261 units for a single year (IFR 2015). IFR estimates that 28 
about 1.3 million new IRs will be employed to work alongside humans in factories 29 
worldwide between 2015 and 2018 (IFR 2015). IFR has termed this incredible rise as 30 
‘conquering the world’ by robots (IFR 2015). 31 
 32 
Parallel to this proliferation of IRs, IFR predicts an exponential rise in service robots 33 
too, which will reach 31m by 2018 (Cookson 2015).
 
The Foundation for Responsible 34 
Robotics (FRR) identifies the areas of usage of service robots: these machines  are 35 
operational in, inter alia, entertaining and taking care of children and elderly people, 36 
preparing food and cooking in restaurants, cleaning residential premises, and milking 37 
cows (Cookson 2015). There are presently a total of 12m service robots employed 38 
across the globe, as reported by FRR (Cookson 2015). 39 
 40 
The usefulness of robots is undeniable; however, what concerns us are the serious 41 
risks associated with the usage of these robots, as co-workers at work or as 42 
companions of the vulnerable in particular. This is because they have already been 43 
involved in causing numerous deaths around the world. For example, there have been 44 
a total of 26 deaths killed by robots’ malfunctions in the United States (US) over the 45 
past 30 years, whilst the United Kingdom (UK) recorded 77 robot related fatal 46 
accidents in 2005 alone (Noack 2015, quoted from The Economist). A recent accident, 47 
in Frankfurt at a Volkswagen factory on 29 June 2015, was the death of a 22-year old 48 
worker at the hand of a robot, but prosecutors are still undecided as to who should be 49 
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prosecuted for this tragic death (Bora 2015). Worryingly, the robotic industry itself 50 
has its own share of accidents (Dhillon 1991). Even medical robots are not always 51 
trustworthy: a recent study released in July 2015 reveals that surgical robots have 52 
been linked to the deaths of at least 144 and injuries of 1,391 over a period of 14 years 53 
(2000-2013) in the US (Alemzadeh et al. 2015). Many believe that even more harmful 54 
consequences are ‘lying around the corner’ (Cookson 2015), and that these machines 55 
are destined to take over the world (see Leenes and Lucivero 2014).
 
 56 
Despite such a distressing picture, legislators and policymakers remain largely 57 
unmoved. Robotics Professor Noel Sharkey, Chairman of FRR, asserts that it is time 58 
now to take action before robots cause further harm (Cookson 2015). Consistently, the 59 
UK Health and Safety Executive emphasises the need for adequate protection of 60 
people from malfunctioning collaborative robots at work (Health and Safety 61 
Executive 2012). This protection requires regulation, which generally entails 62 
ascription of liability for harm committed by humans or human-made machines. 63 
 64 
Some academic discourse has viewed differently the need for the separate legal 65 
personhood of the possessor of artificial intelligence (PAI) such as robots for decades 66 
(Pagallo2013).  Therefore, a debate persists in the absence of concrete guidelines 67 
about the ‘persons’
1
 to be held liable as to who should take responsibility for such 68 
harm: the manufacturer, the employer, or the machines themselves. One group of the 69 
debate argues that robots should be conferred with personality in order to exonerate 70 
their makers and users from potential liability; the other group strongly opposes this 71 
view. The primary basis of the proponent’s arguments is an analogy between robots 72 
and corporations, though robots are sporadically likened to, animals and idols as well. 73 
                                                          
1
 The terms ‘person’ or ‘persons’ in this article refers to ‘legal personality’ unless otherwise mentioned, 
because we omit ‘moral personality’ from consideration in this piece.  
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 74 
This article critically examines the attributes of personality from legal points of view 75 
in exclusion of moral personality
2
 and applies them to corporations, idols, 76 
chimpanzees and robots, with a view to finding a rationale for ascribing legal 77 
personality to robots. Admittedly, corporations have legal personality recognised 78 
worldwide; idols’ legal personality is accepted in some jurisdictions, chimpanzees’ 79 
personality has been denied repeatedly, whilst robots’ legal personhood has not been 80 
recognised as yet anywhere, to the best of our knowledge. The analysis in this article 81 
relies on both judicial and scholarly interpretations of the attributes of legal 82 
personality, and concludes that industrial and services robots do not meet those 83 
personhood qualities, and therefore the claim for their personality is unfounded. 84 
 85 
2. Concept of Legal Personhood – Creation and Recognition 86 
None of the three ‘human’ creations being robots, idols and corporations – nor the 87 
animal chimpanzees that are the concern of this article can be defined as a person, 88 
according to the ordinary dictionary meaning of the word, which recognises the 89 
personhood of living human beings only. None of these three are rational creations 90 
with the capability of ‘feeling’ and ‘willing’ that would be directly comparable with 91 
that of humans, except chimpanzees which have some similarities with human beings. 92 
However, legal personhood is not necessarily synonymous with or confined to human 93 
beings (Byrn v New York City Health & Hosp Corp 1972). When the term 94 
‘personality’ comes to legal concepts, conferring this status (personality) on any entity 95 
depends upon a given jurisdiction having an independent legal system. This is why 96 
there is no uniformity across legal systems in recognising entities as a legal person 97 
                                                          
2
 For differences between legal and moral personality, see Blyth (1906). 
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(Gray 1909).
 
For example, some idols are legal persons in some countries such as 98 
India, but not in others, such as the UK, and this dissimilarity exists even though both 99 
countries belong to the common law family (see Bumper Development Corp Ltd v 100 
Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis 1991).  101 
 102 
Generally, law confers certain rights and imposes specific duties on legal persons, 103 
entitles them to own and dispose of property and to sue others in their own right in 104 
order to enforce these entitlements, and permits them to be sued by others following 105 
any breach of legal duty owed to another person or to the rest of the world. A person 106 
is thus defined in law by reference to ‘rights’ and ‘duties’, which means that a legally 107 
recognised person is subject to legal rights and duties (Smith 1928, see also Gray 108 
1909). As defined in Black’s Law Dictionary, a person is a ‘human being,’ or ‘natural 109 
person,’ and ‘[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognised by law as having 110 
the rights and duties of a human being’ (see Matter of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v 111 
Stanley 2015/hereinafter Stanley 2015’).
3
 Similarly, covering both natural and 112 
artificial persons, Butterworths Australian Legal Dictionary describes a person as ‘a 113 
separate legal entity, recognised by the law as having rights and obligations’ that 114 
includes human beings and entities of humans only whom ‘the law regards as capable 115 
of rights and duties’ (Nygh 1997, citations omitted). It further clarifies, referring to 116 
Salmond, that the capability of enjoying rights and performing duties is the exclusive 117 
criterion of legal personality, and adds that any beings who possess this capability are 118 
legal persons, and conversely other beings who lack this capability are not such 119 
persons, regardless of whether the beings are human or not (Nygh 1997).  Hence, 120 
                                                          
3
 Cited in Stanley 2015). However, the citation in  People ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc v 
Lavery 2014/ ‘Lavery 2014’)  was: ‘ Black’s Law Dictionary defines the term “person” as “[a] human 
being” or, as relevant here, “[a]n entity (such as a corporation) that is recognized by law as having the 
rights and duties [of] a human being” [emphasis added]: Garner (1999).  The court also cited (Salmond 
1947) for a similar view.     
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conferring legal personality is inherently connected with the conferral of legal rights 121 
and the imposition of legal duties (see Gray 1909; Salmond 1916; Holland 1900; 122 
Pollock 1923).
 
 123 
 124 
The recognition of legal personality is a means of mutually respecting persons’ rights 125 
and of enforcing legal control against any breaches thereof. When P is compelled by 126 
the society or the state (state and society are used interchangeably) to do or to forbear 127 
something in favour of Q, and this compulsion is backed up by a threat of legal 128 
sanctions, it implies that the latter has a legal right and the former owes a 129 
corresponding duty (Corbin 1920).
4
 Hence, mutual rights and duties necessarily set up 130 
a legal relation between two persons, and no such relation can exist between a person 131 
and a thing or property such as an 
 
animal or a car (Corbin 1920). The relation 132 
between a person and a thing or property is rather ‘physical’;
5
 however, the owner of 133 
the thing has many legal relations to other persons surrounding it, for example, 134 
preventing others from trespassing on it, or transferring it to anyone (Corbin 1920). 135 
To clarify, a legal relation represents facts embracing ‘acts’ and ‘events’ (Corbin 136 
1920).
 
As defined by Corbin, ‘[a]n act is one of that class of facts manifest to the 137 
senses that consists of voluntary physical movements … of human beings’ (Corbin 138 
1920). An act also includes forbearance that denotes ‘a consciously willed absence of 139 
physical movement. Animals other than men can act or forbear, but they do not 140 
become parties to a legal relation’ (Corbin 1920). Corbin also defines ‘events’ to 141 
mean changes in the prevailing ‘totality of facts, including the acts of human beings’ 142 
(Corbin 1920). The assertion of the presence of a specific legal relation implicitly 143 
denotes the existence of certain facts expressing our existing mental concept of future 144 
                                                          
 
4
 For an analysis of the words ‘rights’ ‘duties’ and ‘liabilities, see Corbin (1920).  
5
 Physical Relation: ‘A relation perceivable by the senses, between two physical objects. This would 
include relations of space, time, weight, color, density, and the like’: Corbin (1920).  
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social consequences (Corbin 1920).
 
For example, Corbin provides that  a ‘statement 145 
that a legal relation exists between A and B is a prediction as to what society, acting 146 
through its courts or executive agents, will do or not do for one and against the other’ 147 
(Corbin 1920).  148 
 149 
Unlike the relation between two individuals, the relation between an individual and a 150 
corporation as a person may always be reduced to many legal relations separately, 151 
with every individual standing behind it, though they are combined into one for 152 
convenience (Corbin 1920).  According to Salmond, a more satisfactory definition of 153 
legal personality refers to the capacity for legal relations (Salmond 1916; Holland 154 
1900). It means that a legal person shall have the capacity to establish, maintain and 155 
effectuate legal relations with others, staying within the bounds of law. 156 
 157 
The word ‘rights’ used in describing personality connotes legal relations between 158 
persons. It is interconnected with duties and it contains legally enforceable claims 159 
against others who are obliged not to breach such relations (Corbin 1920). A legal 160 
person who knows that he/she has a certain right should be able to answer the 161 
question: ‘What must another do for me?’ Corbin (1920). Hence the holder of rights 162 
needs to have the awareness of its own entitlements and others’ obligations of 163 
performance. To compel such performance, the possessor of a right is entitled to 164 
utilise the available legal recourses through the state (Corbin 1924).
 
A right provides 165 
an option to its holder to do or not to do a certain act that is not forbidden nor 166 
commanded by law, while the act forms the content of the right in question (Terry 167 
1916). Again, the existence of a right is a question of law, and the exercise of the right 168 
entails its holder’s conscious choice about doing or not doing something. 169 
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 170 
As implied above, the enjoyment of one’s rights requires the existence of duties of 171 
others and their performance of those duties. Duties of a person as a constituent 172 
element of legal relations are described as responsibilities commanded by law to do or 173 
to forbear something 
 
for the benefit of others, the failure in, or disobedience of, 174 
which will attract a remedy (Terry 1916; Corbin 1920). A person who bears a 175 
particular duty with the knowledge of its existence, compulsion in its performance, 176 
and sanctions against its disobedience, should be able to answer the question: ‘What 177 
must I do for another?’
 
(Corbin 1920) Similar to the enjoyment of rights, the 178 
performance of duties warrants their subject to have awareness of his/her/its 179 
(subject’s) relevant obligations, and to perform such obligations accordingly, in order 180 
to avoid legal sanctions to be exerted by the society in the event of failure or 181 
disobedience. For example, trespass to land or trespass to the person with the required 182 
guilty mind demonstrates disobedience to one’s obligations to refrain from doing so, 183 
thus committing trespass attracts liability under both torts and criminal law. 184 
 185 
The rights and duties discussed above as essential ingredients of personality justify 186 
the ascription of personhood from the viewpoint of its purposes. The principal 187 
purpose of legal personhood, conferred on whomever or whatever, is to facilitate the 188 
regulation of human conduct by an organised society (Smith 1928).
 
This facilitation is 189 
effected through the regulation of the conduct of the subjects of law by reference to 190 
legal relations, while conduct includes both acts and omissions (Terry 1916). 191 
Generally, any legal liability is imposed for a breach of someone’s right with an 192 
ultimate objective of maintaining order in the society. For example, killing of a person 193 
by an intentional act or a grossly negligent omission is penalised due to the violation 194 
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of the right to life of the deceased. To this end, the imposition of a duty aims to 195 
prevent consequences which may come about in the absence or non-performance of 196 
the duty at hand; the duty not to kill someone aims to avoid that death, for example 197 
(Terry 1916).
 
This consequence can amount to a violation of one’s right (Terry 1916). 198 
According to Lundstedt’s conception of the meaning of legal right, the sole purpose 199 
for which law exists is to prevent harm of the community or to confer social benefit 200 
(Lundstedt cited in Allen 1931). The law protects these rights by imposing duties on 201 
others and providing remedies against any breach thereof. More precisely, as West 202 
terms it, a ‘breach of duty is an act of injustice’ (West 2010).  203 
 204 
The duty imposed on a person is said to correspond to the right of another where the 205 
former owes the duty to the latter; however, when the duty is imposed by criminal 206 
law, it is regarded as owed to the state (Terry 1916). Some of the paramount duties 207 
imposed by law generally include: (i) duties not to do any act which will cause 208 
injuries or death to others; (ii) duties of possessors of actively dangerous things, such 209 
as ferocious animals or man-made treacherous products (industrial or social robots, 210 
for example) to prevent them from causing harm; and (iii) duties not to take 211 
possession of property in violation of others’ rights or legal interest (Terry 1916).
 
A 212 
legal interest is defined as ‘[t]he aggregate of the legal relations of a person with 213 
respect to some specific physical object or the physical relations of specific objects’ 214 
(Corbin 1920). 215 
 216 
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Case law has consistently recognised the correlative rights and duties that attach to 217 
legal personhood.
6
 It is judicially recognised that ‘[s]o far as legal theory is 218 
concerned, a person is any being whom the law regards as capable of rights and 219 
duties. . . . Persons are the substances of which rights and duties are the attributes. It is 220 
only in this respect that persons possess juridical significance, and this is the exclusive 221 
point of view from which personality receives legal recognition’ (Lavery 2014, 222 
citations omitted). Most recently the Supreme Court of New York (NY-SC) in Matter 223 
of Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc. v Stanley (Stanley) upheld that the autonomy and 224 
self-determination of any entity are not regarded as the basis for granting it rights 225 
(Stanley 2015). Rather, the Appellate Division of the NY-SC (NY-SCAD) in People 226 
ex rel Nonhuman Rights Project Inc v Lavery (Lavery), which was followed in 227 
Stanley, applied the prevailing attributes of personality, in determining the 228 
personhood of a chimpanzee, that legal personhood has unfailingly been defined by 229 
reference to both rights and duties (Lavery 2014). Central to the legal personality is 230 
thus the ability to enjoy rights and to discharge duties (Duff 1929).
 
 231 
 232 
Free will is a critical element of personhood where the person is subject of a legal 233 
right, because its existence is needed to exercise such a right, and it is not necessary to 234 
have this power for a person who is bound by a legal duty (Gray 1909). However, a 235 
different view exists that gives emphasis to duties instead of rights with respect to a 236 
juristic person (Machen Jr 1911).
 
A ‘juristic person’, as Gray describes, is one who is 237 
not a human being, but rather a legal person composed of humans with the objective 238 
of advancing certain interests, for example states and corporations (Gray 1909). Also, 239 
                                                          
6
 The case can be found in: Smith v ConAgra Foods, Inc (2013) ; Calaway v Practice Mgt  Servs, Inc 
(2010); Wartelle v Women's & Children's Hosp, Inc (1997): Cited in People ex rel Nonhuman Rights 
Project Inc v Lavery (2014). 
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with respect to affording legal personality, authorities primarily consider whether law 240 
can address its commands to those who are seeking personhood, as understanding and 241 
acting upon such commands is only possible for those who are rational beings having 242 
the capability of feeling and volition (Machen Jr 1911). Gray thinks that there can be 243 
no legal personhood without having a will to exercise the right, and its (right) owner 244 
must exercise the willpower in enjoying it (Gray 1909). Linking this with the concept 245 
of right, Salmond says that in order to have right, one must be capable of interests that 246 
may be affected by others, and correspondingly, also be capable of duties not to act 247 
affecting the interests of others (Salmond 1916). 248 
 249 
Thus the idea of personhood entails an entity to be a legal subject able to enjoy rights 250 
and to perform duties, rather than being merely an object, in order for it to be a legally 251 
recognised person. This concept of personhood, developed by experts of Canon law in 252 
the 13
th
 century (Pagallo 2013), continues to dominate the administration of justice to 253 
date, as most recently interpreted by the NY-SC in Stanley, which involved the 254 
determination of personhood of two chimpanzees (Stanley 2015).
 7
  255 
 256 
In a nutshell, the requirements or attributes of legal personhood are: (i) a person shall 257 
be capable of being a subject of law; (ii) being a legal subject entails the ability to 258 
exercise rights and to perform duties; and (iii) the enjoyment of rights needs to 259 
exercise awareness and choice.   260 
 261 
Different kinds of persons that may be recognised by various legal systems can be 262 
classified as: normal human beings; abnormal human beings (eg, infants); 263 
                                                          
7
  The case has been discussed at some length further later in this article.  
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supernatural beings (eg, angels); animals; inanimate objects (eg, idols); and 264 
incorporated entities (eg, corporations) (Gray 1909).
 
This article examines the legal 265 
status of the latter three categories, excluding human and supernatural beings, with a 266 
view to assessing the presence of the personhood attributes in robots and in light of 267 
these three. In doing so, an emphasis will be given to the corporate legal personality, 268 
which is often compared with robots in advocating the latter’s legal personality (see 269 
Hallevy 2010a, b).
8
 Robots are also sometimes likened to animals (see Bertolini 270 
2013). However, Bertolini rejects that analogy, asserting that the central argument of 271 
those who make such a comparison – that weakly autonomous robots and animals 272 
behave sensing the environmental conditions independently of human directions – is 273 
not sufficient to equate these two unequals: one is natural whilst the other is a human 274 
creation (Bertolini 2013). Therefore this untenable comparison does not warrant any 275 
changes to be brought about in the existing legal paradigm by affording personality to 276 
robots (Bertolini 2013).
 
Both idols and chimpanzees have been included in the present 277 
article in order to show the reasons for recognising the former’s personality while 278 
refusing the latter’s. Those reasons will provide insight into the lack of substance in 279 
the advocacy of robots’ personhood.  280 
 281 
3. Corporations as a Legal Person 282 
A company or corporation (used interchangeably) from a legal viewpoint is an entity 283 
created by humans and recognised by law as an artificial person having attributes of 284 
personhood conferred on it through incorporation by a state agency, mainly for the 285 
convenience of all others in dealing with this organisation, which operates for profits 286 
or other purposes with perpetuity in its existence and simplicity in its relations with 287 
                                                          
8
 Idols are also regarded as a ‘juristic person’ as will be shown later in this article.  
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the rest of the world. Corporations emerged as a division of society and progressively 288 
changed to an association of individuals (Davis 1909); however, at present a single 289 
person is sufficient to form a company.
9
 Corporations are now major players in both 290 
national and international economies, while contemporary societies are intensely 291 
dependent upon these entities: we are all affected by them one way or another. This 292 
reality necessitates the regulation of corporations, which has ultimately become a part 293 
of social governance (Farrar 2005).
 
Despite such significance of corporations for 294 
human societies, obtaining the recognition of corporations as a separate legal person 295 
was a difficult task. The difficulty lies in the attribute that legal persons bear legal 296 
duties in exchange for their legal rights (Lavery 2014). Given these personhood 297 
attributes, it has ‘puzzled legal theorists’ (Ripken 2010)
10
 for years as to whether a 298 
corporation should be regarded as a separate person independent of its owners and 299 
managers (see, for example, Freund 1897; Hallis 1930; Nekam 1938; Stoljar 1973; 300 
Cohen 1935; Radin 1932; Vinogradoff 1924; Wolff 1938). Nevertheless the corporate 301 
separate personality is now recognised in all legal systems, based mainly on the 302 
principle established in Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22 though their 303 
liabilities may vary depending on the specific provisions of a given jurisdiction.
11
 304 
This personality enables the entity to serve as a single contracting party independent 305 
of its owners and managers, and this is said to be the first and foremost contribution 306 
of corporate law (Kraakman et al. 2009).
 
This personality has a strong bearing on its 307 
operations and interaction with others.  308 
Significance of the Separate personality  309 
                                                          
9
 For example, see s114 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth); s123 of the Companies Act 2006 (UK).     
10
 This article has been generously followed in discussing the corporate personality section in the 
present article.  
11
 In Germany, corporations cannot be held liable under criminal law, however can be fined for 
regulatory offences, in contrast, they can be criminally liable even for manslaughter in major common 
law countries including the United Kingdom, the United States, Australia. 
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The separate personality bestows the legal capacity of entering into almost all legal 310 
relations with other persons.
12
 It demarcates the assets of the entity itself and those of 311 
its owners; as a result it can shield its own assets from the intervention of its owners 312 
or their personal creditors, because company’s creditors are given priority over 313 
investors – this is called ‘entity shielding’ (see Hansmann et al. 2006).  314 
Another important rule in this regard is ‘liquidation protection’, which makes 315 
shareholders or their personal creditors unable to withdraw their investment at the 316 
time of financial trouble of the company (Hansmann and Kraakman 2001). This 317 
shielding makes corporate contractual commitments credible to the outside world 318 
(Kraakman et al. 2009).
 
A corporation is entitled to enter into a contract like an 319 
individual (see s124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Indeed, it can sue and be 320 
sued; another important benefit of this personality is the elimination of the need to 321 
name or specify in judicial proceedings, all shareholders and other individuals behind 322 
the corporation that intends to sue another or is sued by others, such as a creditor or 323 
regulator (Kraakman et al. 2009). All these entitlements are critical to the operation of 324 
a business with a separate personality, as they enhance the credibility of corporate 325 
transactions and afford simplicity in dealing with a corporation for business and 326 
governance purposes (Kraakman et al. 2009). These benefits are convincing for the 327 
separate personhood of corporations, and this has been granted based on the attributes 328 
of rights and duties. Although there is almost complete unanimity on the need for 329 
corporate personality, it is viewed differently in legal discourses that have contributed 330 
to the emergence of different theories of corporations.  331 
Legal Theories of the Corporate Separate Personality  332 
                                                          
12
 See, for example, s 124 of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) in Australia. It beings with: ‘A company 
has the legal capacity and powers of an individual….’ 
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There are three prominent theories of corporate separate personhood: (i) an artificial 333 
and dependent person theory; (ii) an aggregate person theory; and (iii) a real and 334 
independent person theory (Ripken 2010). These theories view corporations 335 
differently from one another, to some extent. These theories are briefly discussed 336 
below with a view to finding a rationale for corporate separate personhood (For a 337 
detailed discussion of these theories, see Ripken 2010). 338 
Artificial and Dependent Person Theory 339 
The theory of artificial and dependent persons believes that there is no physical 340 
existence of a corporation: it is an abstract idea constructed by law. So a corporation 341 
is just a legal construct, an artificial creation of law and humans; its personhood is a 342 
legal fiction conferred by law solely for the facilitation of trade and commerce 343 
(Ripken 2010). Maitland stipulated that a corporation itself can do only one thing: 344 
appoint an agent to act on its behalf (cited in Duff 1929). Duff explains that if 345 
shareholders in a meeting adopt three resolutions – appointing an employee; entering 346 
into a contract by accepting an offer; and inciting the commission of an offence – only 347 
the first one would be the act of the entity: the other two may be either acts of its 348 
agents or not acts at all, depending on governing laws (Duff 1929).  349 
The second characteristic of a company under this theory is its dependence on law; as 350 
Niman states, a corporation does not come into being until the legal formalities are 351 
met and its incorporation is certified by the appropriate state agency (Niman 2012, 352 
citations omitted).  353 
Regarding the rights and duties which are our basic concerns, Gray asserts that the 354 
name of a corporation is basically an abbreviation used in law and commerce in order 355 
to confer specific rights on, and perform duties by, individuals contractually or 356 
otherwise related to or affected by the entity (see Gray 1909; Wolff 1938). As stated 357 
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by Marshal CJ in Trustees of Dartmouth College v Woodward (1819) 17 U S 518 358 
about corporations, ‘[i]t is chiefly for the purpose of clothing bodies of men, in 359 
succession, with these qualities and capacities, that corporations were invented, and 360 
are in use.’ However, English courts repeatedly rejected the notion that a corporation 361 
is just a name to avoid the trouble with using the names of numerous individuals, 362 
because it did not seem to reflect the economic and psychological facts of a 363 
corporation with which the law must deal (for example, Salomon v Solomon Co Ltd 364 
1897; Mlacaura v Northern Assurance Co 1925).  365 
 366 
It is to be conceded that the personality of a corporation came into existence through 367 
incorporation by appropriate state authorities as part of a legal process. However, the 368 
concept of artificiality is old, and the assertion that the rights and duties of a 369 
corporation represent those of individuals remained prevalent in this theory. This old 370 
concept changed over time in the mid-19
th
 century, which gave a perception that the 371 
incorporation process is merely a formality. It is now widely believed that the 372 
existence of a company is owed to the natural persons called ‘corporators’ who form 373 
it, and this has significantly diminished the force of the artificial person theory 374 
(Ripken 2010). An alternative view of the perception of a corporate entity as an 375 
aggregate of persons emerged in the second half of the 19
th
 century (Ripken 2010).
 
 376 
Aggregate Person Theory  377 
The main weakness in the aggregate person theory is that its proponents do not 378 
recognise a corporation as a separate and distinct person. They believe that a 379 
corporation is not an artificial entity nor merely a creation of law as such; rather it is 380 
an organisation or association of a group of people who form its individual human 381 
constituents and without whom it would not have any identity of its own or any ability 382 
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to function towards its goals (Ripken 2010; see also Blumberg 1093). Similarly, as 383 
Cressey stipulates, a corporation is virtually a manifestation of natural persons 384 
because it is created, owned, managed and administered by those who thus become 385 
the ultimate actors of the body corporate (cited in Ripken 2010). Diminishing the 386 
distinct personality, the US-SC in Santa Clara County v Southern Pacific Railroad 387 
Company (1886) 118 U S 394 in 1886 pronounced that company’s properties are 388 
those of the individuals behind it. Likewise, according to Morawetz (1886), this 389 
theory reinforces that the rights and duties of a corporation are factually those of 390 
corporators, rather than those of an imaginary person. Salmond spelt out that there are 391 
some natural persons behind every corporation, and initially the interests of those 392 
persons are fictitiously attributed to their corporation, and subsequently their conduct 393 
or acts are also imputed to it in the same way (cited in Duff 1929). This means that a 394 
company represents both the interests and the acts of individuals, rather than those of 395 
its own in the true sense, hence a distinct personality does not exist according to this 396 
theory.  397 
 398 
This theory is thus in sharp contrast to the artificial person theory, as it recognises that 399 
a corporation is not a fiction, but rather does exist as an aggregate of individuals, not 400 
as a separate person independent of its corporators. The basic tenets of this theory are 401 
the negation of artificiality in the corporation as a separate entity, and the merger of 402 
individuals and the entity together, eliminating the distinction between a corporation 403 
and its corporators in term of rights, duties, and properties. However, this does not 404 
reflect the contemporary view of corporations.  405 
 406 
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The limited liability feature of modern corporations stimulated the general public to 407 
invest in securities which contributed to dispersing the spectrum of shareholders and 408 
enlarging corporations by the early twentieth century. This development even more 409 
clearly separated the ownership and control of corporations, given the inability of the 410 
large number of widely scattered shareholders to stay interconnected and to control 411 
their entities, as observed by Berle Jr and Means (1932). This deep separation, which 412 
makes the aggregate theory largely redundant (Phillips 1994), has given birth to a new 413 
theory called the real and independent person theory. 414 
 415 
Real and Independent Person Theory  416 
The real and independent person theory argues that the corporate personality is both 417 
real and natural as opposed to fictitious, and that States have just recognised the 418 
existing fact, rather than creating it (Machen Jr 1911).
 
Gierke posits that once an 419 
organisation has been created by a group of human beings, a body corporate or a 420 
corporate organism is founded per se, which is recognised by law in order to facilitate 421 
trade and commerce by and with this newly created entity (cited in Machen Jr 1911). 422 
They contend that the existence of corporations is an objective fact, and that the 423 
entities have a real presence in our society; therefore corporate life comes into 424 
existence independently of law, and States only officially recognise the pre-existing 425 
fact (Ripken 2010). This doctrine accepts the separation of the entity from its owners 426 
and others who are involved in the corporate enterprise, recognises the perpetuity of 427 
the organisation regardless of any changes in its ownership and management, and at 428 
the same time distinguishes between the personality of a natural person and that of a 429 
corporation (Ripken 2010).
 
Machen asserts that when we admit a corporation is 430 
created by the State, it cannot be fictitious at the same time (Machen Jr 1911).  431 
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 432 
Currently the predominant view is that corporations are real: we recognise that their 433 
citizenship compares with that of humans, they pay taxes and bear social 434 
responsibility, they can be held liable for committing both civil wrongs and crimes in 435 
addition to regulatory breaches. We have thus brought them within the purview of 436 
social governance as a necessity, in that we are all affected by them one way or 437 
another.  438 
 439 
Whichever theory we accept, in reality both individuals and corporations can be held 440 
liable for corporate wrongdoings.
13
 This means that despite the separation of 441 
personality by law, individuals behind a corporation are not immune from the liability 442 
that may arise from the breach of a corporate duty committed by individuals wearing 443 
the veil of incorporation. On the other hand, as well as managers/controllers, 444 
shareholders may be held liable for corporate debts to varying extents, depending on 445 
the type of their company.
14
 Any pecuniary fines paid by corporations are eventually 446 
imposed on stockholders, who are the residual claimants of corporate assets. 447 
Correspondingly, any profits of a corporation are likely to benefit its corporators in 448 
the course of time, in the form of dividends, capital gains or residual payments. 449 
Corporate personhood, discussed below, is based on these theories of corporations 450 
and attributes of personality.  451 
 452 
Corporation as a Legal Person – Do They Satisfy the Attributes of Personhood? 453 
                                                          
13
 See more than 50 sections listed in s1317E on civil penalty and Schedule 3 containing 346 sections 
on criminal liability of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), Australia. 
14
 Generally, a company can be of different types by reference to the liability of its shareholders in the 
event of its winding up. These are: company limited by shares, company limited by guarantee, 
company limited by both shares and guarantees, unlimited company, and no liability company: For 
details (see Harris et al. 2016).   
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Corporations are called a ‘juristic person’, the essence of which lies in subjection to 454 
duties, rather than in the possession of rights (Machen Jr 1911). Corporate personality 455 
will be negated if the ordinary meaning of personhood is applied, because it is not a 456 
rational being, it is incapable of understanding legal commands and it is unable to do 457 
anything without its human agents (Machen Jr 1911). So when law commands a 458 
corporation to do or not to do certain things, it goes in essence to the individuals 459 
behind it; if the commands are violated, a corporation can be penalised as a way of 460 
directly or indirectly punishing the people who manage (Machen Jr 1911) and/or own 461 
it.
15
 According to Machen Jr (2011), corporate entity is used by law as a mere sight 462 
aiming at shooting the individuals hiding behind it.  So individuals are not immune 463 
from liabilities arising from failure in discharging corporate duties or in complying 464 
with law.
16
 Both corporations and individuals wearing the veil of incorporation can be 465 
held liable under administrative,
17
 civil (see, for civil cases, Hubbard 2014; Sexton et 466 
al. 2010), civil penalty
18
 and even criminal liability
19
 regimes. Notably, regarding 467 
offences, both the actus reus (physical element) and mens rea (mental element) of an 468 
offence are imputed to the company from its directing mind and will under the 469 
common law organic theory of corporation, also known as the directing mind theory 470 
or the identification doctrine, as expounded by the House of Lords in Tesco 471 
                                                          
15
 The owners are punished in effect when a corporation is penalised in that any pecuniary penalties 
reduce the value of their ownership holdings, and if a corporate capital punishment is awarded, then the 
owners are in most cases likely to suffer even more financial losses given the additional costs involved 
in the winding up or liquidation procedure, which will be paid as a priority payment. 
16
 For numerous civil cases where corporations and/or individuals were held liable for corporate 
wrongdoings (see Hubbard 2014; Sexton et al. 2010).   
17
 See, for example of administrative actions against corporations and individuals, Australian Securities 
and Investment Commission (ASIC 2015).   
18
 Recent leading cases in Australia under its corporate civil penalty regime: ASIC v Macdonald (No 
11) (2009); ASIC v Macdonald (No 12) (2009); ASIC v Hellicar (2012); A v Healey (2011); ASIC v 
Healey (No 2) (2011).   
19
 See for recent several manslaughter cases in the United Kingdom: Filedfisher (2015). 
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Supermarkets Ltd v Nattrass [1972] AC 153.
20
 Put simply, only senior executives of a 472 
company can be its directing mind and will.  473 
 474 
 Similar to the indirect imposition of duties and corresponding penalties on human 475 
being who clothe the corporation, legal rights too, when conferred on such an entity, 476 
are due to be carried to those individuals who compose it (Machen Jr 1911). Ihering 477 
notes that individuals, not corporations, are the real subject of the rights conferred on 478 
corporations (Machen Jr 1911). Moreover, the legal personhood of corporations is not 479 
absolute because the corporate separate personality may be ignored for liability 480 
purposes in some instances by lifting the corporate veil (see Sloan Shipyards 481 
Corporation v Emergency Fleet Corporation 1921; United States v Walter 1923).  482 
 483 
Hence, corporations are, in reality, formed by humans and recognised by the State as 484 
being all for the purposes of human benefits. Individuals embody a corporation: the 485 
rights and duties of the latter effectually refer to those of the former. When it comes to 486 
any wrongdoings, both physical and mental elements are attributed from individuals 487 
to their corporate entity. Hence, in recognising the juristic personality of a 488 
corporation, all of the personality attributes of individuals behind it are directly 489 
imputed to their corporation. We can now conclude that the personhood of 490 
corporation does meet the needs of legal personality (i.e., subject of law, rights, 491 
duties, awareness, and willpower).  492 
4. Idols as a Legal Person 493 
                                                          
20
  The doctrine was applied in a more recent case of Transco PLC v Her Majesty’s Advocate (2004). 
For its initial consideration, see Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd (1915). A 
discussion of this common law theory falls beyond the scope of this article, however, for its analysis at 
some length see Solaiman and Begum (2014).  
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An idol is a statue created and worshipped by humans as a god or goddess, perhaps 494 
most popularly in the Hindu religion. As a legal person, a Hindu idol has been held to 495 
have peculiar desires and a will of its own which must be respected, as held by the 496 
Privy Council in Pramatha Nath Mullick v Pradyumna Kumar Mullick (1925) 27 497 
BOMLR 1064 (Mullick) in 1925 (see also Yesey-Fitzgfrad 1925). Hence, Hindu idols 498 
have long been judicially recognised in some jurisdictions, such as India, as a legal 499 
person, founded upon religious customs (Duff 1929; Lord Shaw in Mullick 1925).
 
500 
Shaw J held in Mullick (1925), which involved a dispute arising out of the controlling 501 
and worship of a Hindu family idol, ruled that such an idol is a juristic person and 502 
held: 503 
 504 
A Hindu idol is, according to long established authority, founded upon the religious 505 
customs of the Hindus, and the recognition thereof by Courts of law, a “juristic 506 
entity.” It has a juridical status with the power of suing and being sued. Its interests 507 
are attended to by the person who has the deity in his charge and who is in law its 508 
manager with all the powers which would, in such circumstances, on analogy, be 509 
given to the manager of the estate of an infant heir, [i]t is unnecessary to quote the 510 
authorities; for this doctrine, thus simply stated, is firmly established. 511 
 512 
The Privy Council further clarified that a Hindu idol is not a chattel or personal 513 
property as such.
 
It ruled that ‘this was not a dedication, in any sense of the word, of 514 
the idol as property, nor of the idol at all. It was a dedication of real estate in trust for 515 
the idol, recognised as a legal entity, to which such dedication might be made’ 516 
(Mullick 1925).   517 
 518 
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These powerful judicial stipulations resemble the most fundamental feature of 519 
corporations in articulating the legal status of an idol.  520 
 521 
 Although an idol differs overtly from a company in terms of physique, they are 522 
comparable to each other in that their attributes of personality are borrowed from 523 
human beings who are lawfully entitled to manage them with all the powers, as with a 524 
guardian or manager of an infant and his/her assets (Duff 1929; Lord Shaw in Mullick 525 
1925). In other words, an idol’s legal interests are attended to by its managers. 526 
Savigny thus rightly compared a corporation with an idol in respect of juristic 527 
personality, which is composed of humans (Duff 1929)
 
. Consistently, referring to the 528 
capacity for rights and liabilities, Duff admits that a recognised idol is a legal person 529 
as good as a human being and a body corporate (Duff 1929). This capacity does refer 530 
to that of managers of respective idols. When an idol’s legal personality comes to its 531 
power of will, a question may emerge as to how to ascertain such a will. Perhaps the 532 
best answer would be that whatever the relevant law regards as its power of will, 533 
giving due consideration to the interests of the worshipers as well as social interests in 534 
materialising the wishes of pious founders, will be the idol’s will (Duff 1929; Lord 535 
Shaw in Mullick 1925).
 
To clarify further, the Privy Council in Mullick 1925 536 
pronounced that the will of the idol will be expressed by its guardian, the manager.  537 
 538 
Therefore, rights and duties of an idol are those of the individuals having managerial 539 
powers. Based on the similarities between corporations and idols in terms of 540 
personality attributes, we can draw a conclusion that an idol’s personhood is justified, 541 
and that the corpus of an idol is used just as a symbol of power, god or goddess, 542 
whose affairs are managed by humans.  543 
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 544 
5. Chimpanzee as a Legal Person 545 
An animal is distinct from corporations and idols in that it is naturally a living thing, 546 
with its peculiar characteristics being vicious or otherwise, and is capable of doing 547 
acts that include both things it has been trained for, and anything of its own will, 548 
depending on the very nature of a particular animal and the erratic behaviour of others 549 
that may cause the animal’s behavioural deviation (Bertolini 2013). Bertolini (2013) 550 
appreciates the prevailing owners’ liability provisions for their animals’ misconduct, 551 
and in the same way he positively argues that the owner or user of the robot can be 552 
held liable for the harm caused by robot. However, he also adds that makers or 553 
manufacturers can also be held liable if their products were found to be defective 554 
(Bertolini 2013).Although an animal’s personality is not recognised in law, it has 555 
recently and recurrently become an issue before the courts in the US, the decisions of 556 
which would be useful for determining the eligibility of robots’ personhood, 557 
particularly with respect to robot’s so-called ‘autonomy’, the central issue of 558 
advocating the machine’s personality.  559 
On 30 July 2015, the NY-SC in a landmark judgment in Stanley (2015) pronounced 560 
that chimpanzees are not legal persons. The verdict was delivered following a writ 561 
petition of habeas corpus by an organisation, Nonhuman Rights Project, Inc (NhRP). 562 
The NhRP submitted the writ petition for freeing two chimpanzees kept in a 563 
laboratory of the Stony Brook University, New York for biomedical experimentation. 564 
They first unsuccessfully lodged their petition on behalf of the detained chimpanzees 565 
with the Suffolk County Supreme Court (Suffolk Court) in December 2013, where 566 
their petition was dismissed by its Appellate Division on the ground that the NhRP 567 
did not have the right to appeal on behalf of chimpanzees (NhRP 2015). In their 568 
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petition, the NhRP asked for the termination of the chimpanzees’ captivity and for 569 
releasing them into the care of ‘Save the Chimps’, a sanctuary in Florida (NhRP 570 
2015).They likened the animals’ captivity to human imprisonment, and claimed that 571 
the chimpanzees had the right to not be imprisoned against their will (NhRP 2015).  572 
The NhRP took the dismissal as an error of the Suffolk Court and then moved to the 573 
NY-SC in Manhattan in March 2015. They lodged their proceeding pursuant to Art 70 574 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules (CPLR) and under the common law for a writ of 575 
habeas corpus on behalf of the two chimpanzees. Unlike the original petition in 576 
Suffolk, this time they were initially successful in obtaining a show cause order from 577 
the NY-SC issued by Judge Barbara Jaffe in the first of a two-step process (first show 578 
cause and then determination). However, Jaffe J in the second step rejected the 579 
petition in July 2015, pronouncing that chimpanzees are not legal persons, and the 580 
court strictly relied upon the precedent set forth in the Lavery (2014) in 2014. 581 
The petition required a determination as to whether chimpanzees are legal persons 582 
entitled to bring a writ of habeas corpus, a legal challenge against unlawful detention 583 
typically brought by human prisoners, and sometimes in child custody cases. The 584 
NhRP tried to take advantage of the absence of definition of ‘person’ in both Article 585 
70 of the CPLR and the common law of habeas corpus (Stanley 2015). The Court 586 
found no previous judicial decisions evidencing that such a writ had ever been granted 587 
to anyone other than human beings under Article 70 or common law. Nonetheless, the 588 
NY-SC had dealt with the petition referring to  Lavery (2014), that the lack of 589 
precedent does not in itself end the inquiry into whether habeas corpus relief may be 590 
extended to chimpanzees (Stanley 2015). Notably, the petitioner had not claimed the 591 
human rights of chimpanzees, but rather had contended that ‘the law can and should 592 
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employ the legal fiction that chimpanzees are legal persons solely for the purpose of 593 
endowing them with the right of habeas corpus, as the law accepts in other contexts 594 
the “legal fiction” that nonhuman entities, such as corporations, may be deemed legal 595 
persons, with the rights incident thereto’ (Stanley 2015). The petition likened 596 
chimpanzees to humans and further maintained that ‘because chimpanzees possess 597 
fundamental attributes of personhood in that they are demonstrably autonomous, self-598 
aware, and self-determining, and otherwise are very much like humans, “justice 599 
demands” that they be granted the fundamental rights of liberty and equality afforded 600 
to humans’ (Stanley 2015).
 21
 601 
Amicus curiae in presenting independent arguments made a reference to the definition 602 
of ‘person’ provided in the New York State Penal Law (s10.7) that a person 603 
conclusively denotes ‘a human being, and where appropriate, a public or private 604 
corporation, an unincorporated association, a partnership, a government or a 605 
governmental instrumentality.’ Amicus curiae opined that the personality of all these 606 
entities is justified because they are composed of human beings (Stanley 2015). 607 
Referring to this extension of the subjects of the penal provisions, Amicus curiae 608 
persuasively argued that ‘the expanded definition of person in a restricted context 609 
connotes a legislative intent that the definition not be further expanded…. nowhere in 610 
that statute are animals defined as persons’ (Stanley 2015).  611 
The Court critically examines the current trends towards the empathy for animals, 612 
particularly the demands for pets’ legal personhood. For example, given the rights, 613 
love and attachment for pet animals, some commentators argue that animals are 614 
currently ‘quasi-persons’ in law as they are entitled to some rights and protection 615 
                                                          
21
 Autonomous intelligence denotes the ‘capabilities for solving problems involving pattern 
recognition, automated scheduling, and planning based on prior experience’ (Koditschek 1989). 
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though not others (Stanley 2015 citing Matambanadzo 2012). However, Jaffe J states 616 
that as the law presently regards, there is no ‘in-between’ position of personhood for 617 
the purposes of establishing rights because entities are categorised in a simple, binary, 618 
‘all-or-nothing’ fashion (Stanley 2015, citations omitted).Distinguishing persons from 619 
things, Jaffe J adds that the beings recognised as persons have rights to enjoy and 620 
duties to perform, whereas ‘things’ do not have these legal entitlements and 621 
responsibilities (Stanley 2015, citations omitted). Her Honour thus reaffirms that 622 
legally, all animals, regardless of their level of intelligence and physical appearance, 623 
are property (Stanley 2015). 624 
Jaffe J noted the previous 2014 determination of the NY-SCAD in  Lavery (2014), 625 
which involved an identical issue, and the court ruled that ascribing legal personhood 626 
to chimpanzees is ‘inappropriate as they are incapable of bearing any legal 627 
responsibilities and societal duties’ (cited in Stanley 2015). The NY-SCAD, citing 628 
several judicial decisions, distinguished between chimpanzees and currently 629 
recognised legal persons, and stated that corporations are composed of human beings, 630 
therefore they are able to bear legal duties in return for their legal rights, hence their 631 
legal personality is justified (Lavery 2014, citations omitted). Alongside the reliance 632 
on judicial authorities, the courts in both Lavery (2014) and Stanley (2015) also noted, 633 
as further sources of support, the definition of person provided in Black’s Law 634 
Dictionary stated earlier. The Court in Lavery (2014) finally affirmed the denial of 635 
writ of habeas corpus and held that:  636 
A chimpanzee was not a ‘person’ entitled to the rights and protections afforded by the 637 
writ of habeas corpus … because animals, unlike human persons, corporations, and 638 
municipal entities, could not bear any legal duties, submit to societal responsibilities, 639 
or be held legally accountable for their actions; the incapability to bear any legal 640 
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responsibilities and societal duties rendered it inappropriate to confer upon 641 
chimpanzees legal rights. 642 
Jaffe J, in deciding the personhood of chimpanzees in Stanley (2015), overtly relied 643 
upon the precedent set out in Lavery (2014), and rejected the petitioner’s argument 644 
against the applicability of the previous decision ‘that the decision in Lavery (2014) is 645 
based on an erroneous legal analysis or “unsettled” law is immaterial’ (Stanley 2015). 646 
Her Honour thus finally dismissed the proceeding in Stanley (2015) stating that 647 
Lavery (2014) has binding effects according to the doctrine of precedent. Therefore, 648 
chimpanzees are not legal persons based precisely on the lack of being capable of 649 
rights and duties, an essential requirement of personhood (Stanley 2015; Lavery 650 
2014)), despite the important pieces of scientific expert evidence presented before the 651 
Court in Stanley (2015) that:  652 
‘ … humans and chimpanzees share almost 99 percent of their DNA, and 653 
chimpanzees … closely related to human beings .… They share with humans 654 
similarities in brain structure and cognitive development, including a parallel 655 
development of communications skills, as shown by their use and understanding of 656 
sign language…. Chimpanzees also demonstrate self-awareness, recognizing 657 
themselves in mirrors and photographs and on television, and have the capacity to 658 
reflect on their behavior. They manifest a capacity for empathy, are attuned to the 659 
experiences and emotions of others, and imitate and emulate others…. They behave 660 
in ways that reflect moral inclinations … and demonstrate compassion and depression 661 
when a member of their community or familial group dies …. They also have a 662 
cooperative social life … engage in imaginary play, and display a sense of humor …. 663 
Therefore both Stanley and Lavery categorically rejected the demand for personhood 664 
of chimpanzees, which are argued to be closest to humans in terms of appearance and 665 
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of some basic human attributes. Both courts reinforced that a legal person must have 666 
the capability of rights and duties, which requires the ability to properly understand 667 
and follow the commands of law, and that no derogation from this critical need is 668 
currently permissible in legal domains unless any statutes specifically provide 669 
otherwise. The NY-SC further confirmed, no any attributes of human beings (as 670 
identified in the above quotation of scientific evidence on chimpanzee) other than 671 
being capable of rights and duties, nor the look-like physical appearance of any 672 
‘things’, is a determinant in deciding the legal personality of any entities. We can now 673 
look to the position of robots.  674 
6. Industrial Robots as a Potential Legal Person 675 
A robot as a possessor of artificial intelligence (PAI) is said to have five attributes: (i) 676 
the ability to communicate with others; (ii) internal knowledge;
22
 (iii) external or 677 
outside world knowledge;
23
 (iv) some degree of intentionality;
24
 and (v) some degree 678 
of creativity.
25
 Despite having all these, robots are presently recognised as a product 679 
or property at law (see Bertolini 2013; Sexton et al 2010; Hubbard 2014). Floridi 680 
(2009) compares robots with tools which are no different from hammers. However, in 681 
view of the above attributes, some commentators are arguing for partial (quasi) or 682 
full-fledged personhood of these machines. 683 
Asaro (2007) proposes a concept of creating ‘quasi-persons’ for robots, which will 684 
enjoy only partial rights and duties. Solum (1992) argues for a ‘borderline status’ 685 
though indecisively. He critically analysed the personhood of a PAI relying on two 686 
different tests: (i) whether a PAI can serve as a trustee; and (ii) whether a PAI can be 687 
                                                          
22
 Some knowledge about themselves – what they need, what they think etc. 
23
 Awareness of the outside world, past experience etc. 
24
 The ability to act towards achieving specific goals. 
25
 For details of these attributes, see Schank (1987).   
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granted the rights of constitutional personhood. He has provided two scenarios for 688 
these two tests and has discussed potential objections that may be raised against a 689 
PAI’s personality claim (Solum 1992).
 
Regarding the first test, he identified two 690 
objections: the reasonability objection and the judgment objection. Three different 691 
potential objections have been discussed in relation to the second test: a PAI is not a 692 
human; the missing-something argument; and a PAI ought to be property.
26
 Having 693 
addressed all these potential issues, Solum could not firmly conclude that a PAI be 694 
granted legal personality. Rather he has argued for a borderline status in some way, 695 
pointing out reasons for hesitation and uneasiness surrounding the personhood, even 696 
against this new approach (Solum 1992).
 
However, he has clearly mentioned that 697 
‘thinking about personhood for a PAI forces us to acknowledge that we currently lack 698 
the resources to develop a fully satisfactory theory of legal and moral personhood’ 699 
(Solum 1992). Quite logically, Solum (1992) finally concludes in favour of the ‘rights 700 
and duties’ construct of legal personality.
 
 701 
It should be noted that while arguing for a borderline status, Solum refers to the 702 
behavioural aspect of these machines and submits that they ‘behaved the right way 703 
and if cognitive science confirmed that the underlying processes producing these 704 
behaviors were relatively similar to the processes of the human mind, we would have 705 
very good reason to treat an AI as persons’ (Solum 1992). As noted earlier, this point 706 
had been strongly raised and considered carefully by the NY-SC in Stanley in 2015, 707 
following credible evidence in favour of chimpanzees’ personality, and it did not 708 
succeed (Stanley 2015, citations omitted). It means we are not finding any compelling 709 
reasons for robots’ legal personality in this argument.  710 
                                                          
26
 Discussions of these arguments and objections at some length have been avoided in order to keep 
this piece in a manageable size.  For details, see Solum (1992).  
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Hallevy (2010a,b) seems to be a frontrunner in soliciting the world for robots’ full 711 
personality, based mainly on an analogy between robots and corporations with respect 712 
to criminal liability,
 
though he has sometimes compared robots with animals as well 713 
(see Hallevy 2010a, b). The gist of his (Hallevy 2010a, b) arguments is, in his own 714 
words: 715 
Why should AI entities be different from corporations? AI entities are taking larger 716 
and larger parts in human activities, as do corporations. Offenses have already been 717 
committed by AI entities or through them. AI entities have no soul, and some AI 718 
entities have neither body nor soul. Thus, there is no substantive legal difference 719 
between the idea of criminal responsibility imposed on corporations and on AI 720 
entities. It would be outrageous not to subordinate them to human laws, as 721 
corporations have been. … What else is needed?
 
 722 
 723 
While we disagree with the concept that robots have committed offences in the true 724 
sense, the above quoted assertions implicitly deny or plainly overlook the fact that any 725 
punishment imposed on a corporation effectively punishes human beings behind it 726 
(managers and/or owners). Likewise, this article advocates punishing individuals 727 
whose fault, if any, caused the robot’s malfunction contributing to harm sustained by 728 
humans.  To the best of our understanding, Hallevy’s submissions in two of his 729 
articles (Hallevy 2010a, b) and in his book titled When Robots Kill: Artificial 730 
Intelligence under Criminal Law – strongly criticised by Charney (2015), – contain 731 
fundamentally the same arguments in favour of robots’ criminal liability which entails 732 
separate legal personality. He has endeavoured to demonstrate that robots have the 733 
ability to commit actus reus of different types of offences with the requisite 734 
negligence and subjective mens mea, and therefore the machines themselves should 735 
be punished, and Hallevy argues that the objectives of punishment can be achieved by 736 
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punishing these machines (Hallevy 2010a, b; Hallevy 2013).
 
An analysis of the 737 
constituent elements of different types of offences, along with the objectives of 738 
punishment, a huge task by itself, obviously falls outside the scope of the present 739 
article, which aims to be confined to the attributes of legal personality alone. 740 
However, interestingly, he has recommended imposition of criminal liability on 741 
robots without having to justify their legal personality anywhere in his articles apart 742 
from superficial comparison with corporations (Hallevy 2010a, b; Hallevy 2013).
 
743 
While a separate initiative is intended to be undertaken to critically analyse Hallevy’s 744 
claims about robots’ physical and mental capabilities and the justifications for 745 
applying human punishment to machines, from our present perspective there is 746 
evidence that industrial and social robots are still a long way off from attaining such 747 
human capabilities (see Weng et al. 2009; Demaitre 2016). Sartor (2009) asserts that 748 
‘the substitution of intelligent machine for humans in creative tasks is very far away’. 749 
Further to those claims arguing robots’ lacking of the requisite capability, Solum 750 
(1992) iterates that robots do lack several critical attributes of personhood, such as, 751 
intentionality, desires and interests, and therefore they lack the prerequisites laid 752 
down for attributing criminal liability.
27
 All these are relevant to the commission of 753 
actus reus with mens rea. For example, an act constituting actus reus requires ‘a 754 
volitional bodily movement’ exercising power of will (Terry 1916), which cannot 755 
exist in an entity that lacks, intentionality, desires and interests. Vladeck (2014) 756 
mentions that the current law is not necessarily equipped to deal with the incidents in 757 
which injuries will be caused by malfunction of such machines in the absence of a 758 
principal directing the unlawful acts.  759 
 760 
                                                          
27
 Although the notion of BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) plays an important role in Multi Agent 
Systems (Rao and Geogeff 1995), these terms have a very technical meaning in that context, which 
does not entirely correspond to that intended by Solum. 
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 Therefore, robots are still being justifiably treated as ‘products’ for the purposes of 761 
liability (Bertolini 2013). Some commentators suggest that even if we compare robots 762 
with corporations, with respect to rights and responsibilities, a separate set of laws 763 
would be needed for robots (Weng et al. 2009). In contrast to Hallevy, they (Weng et 764 
al. 2009) validly point out that even if robots are ever held responsible for their 765 
actions, a major issue will be determining punishment. They raise doubts about the 766 
effectiveness of applying human punishment to robots, and refer to Asaro who utterly 767 
denied the usefulness punishment claimed by Hallevy (Weng et al. 2009). Charney 768 
(2015) has unequivocally denied Hallevy’s arguments regarding robots’ physical and 769 
mental capabilities with reasons, and so also the justifications for applying the 770 
conventional criminal punishments developed for and applied to humans.  771 
 772 
In anticipation of creating fully autonomous machines in the future, Vladeck (2014) 773 
advocates robots’ personhood for civil law purposes at some point, by arguing that the 774 
ascription of personality would resolve the agency issue because the machines 775 
themselves will become principals in their own right and then self-insurance will be 776 
required in order to meet any legal obligations arising from the damage caused by 777 
their conduct.
 
He then suggests that a broader range of ‘audience’, including the 778 
owner of the faulty machine, will participate in funding the insurance (Vladeck 779 
(2014).
 
These arguments seem self-conflicting in that when the machine will be a 780 
separate person, why should ‘other persons’ pay for the insurance of robots? Then a 781 
counter question may be raised as to who pays for the corporate insurance. The 782 
answer would be the corporation itself, which is made up of human beings through 783 
whom the entity operates as it does not have any physical or intellectual ability to do 784 
anything whatsoever without its human agents. This is a critical point where machines 785 
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made by humans differ absolutely from corporations. Quite consistently, Bertolini 786 
(2013) argues in respect of civil liability that even if a separate personality is 787 
attributed to a software agent, it does not make any difference with respect to liability 788 
because the same humans or corporations standing behind it will still have to bear the 789 
liability unless robots earn revenue from their operation. 790 
 791 
Having shown the aforesaid rebuttals of Hallevy’s solicitation for robots’ personhood, 792 
we consider that no further discussion of elements of crime is warranted in this article 793 
to determine robots’ personhood attributes. Instead, if we turn to our requirement of 794 
the capability of rights and duties, robots are unlikely to meet the judicial 795 
interpretations of this essential requisite, given that they are human-made products 796 
with limited self-control as programmed to date, particularly those used in industrial 797 
and social sectors. Other human characteristics as found in chimpanzees, even if they 798 
are present in robots, will not help much in conferring legal personhood on these 799 
machines as those were rejected by the NY-SC in Stanley. The arguments for 800 
corporate personality may apply to idols’ personhood, as their interests are attended to 801 
by humans and any religious devotion can be expressed only by human beings in an 802 
acceptable manner, but the same rationales do not apply to robots and chimpanzees. 803 
Rather, the latter two, robots and chimpanzees, may be compared to each other to 804 
some extent, in terms for example of temperament, ability to act, but those are 805 
insufficient for separate personhood as decreed judicially. It could also be argued that 806 
an idol can be constructed with a physically unique appearance as an art, and can 807 
therefore be bodily destroyed as well. These features of an idol may equally apply to 808 
robots. However, they are, as artefacts, just objects, therefore are not directly subjects 809 
of legal rights and duties. Referring to robots as artefacts, Leenes and Lucivero (2014) 810 
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emphasise ‘they do not have legal rights and legal duties and they cannot perform 811 
legal acts’.  Nevertheless, as alluded to earlier, a Hindu idol is recognised as a legal 812 
person clearly because of its being a juristic person that distinguishes it from a robot.  813 
 814 
As Jaffe J points out in Stanley (2015, citations omitted), referring to rights and duties 815 
for the purposes of legal personhood, creatures are categorised into two: either a legal 816 
person or not (‘all-or-nothing’ fashion).
 
If we give due consideration to the foregoing 817 
discussion of legal personality in respect of corporations, idols and chimpanzees, we 818 
can logically infer that robots, as a prima facie case, should not be granted 819 
personhood, precisely because they do not meet the fundamental tenets of such legal 820 
recognition as is inextricably linked with rights and duties. Through this link, 821 
personhood is generally attached to human beings, and although law recognises 822 
personality of corporations in all legal systems, and of idols in some jurisdictions, 823 
these latter two are juristic persons composed of human beings one way or another, 824 
and they cannot do anything without their human agents. Therefore, the rights and 825 
duties relevant to their personality refer basically to those of humans behind them, 826 
which stands in stark contrast to the advocacy for robots’ personhood. When we argue 827 
for robots’ personality on the basis of artificial knowledge, or ability to make 828 
independent decisions of their own, they still cannot satisfy the personhood attributes 829 
as interpreted by both the judiciary and academia. Chimpanzees had all of these 830 
attributes which are argued to be present in robots; nonetheless the repeated appeals 831 
for the animals’ personality have failed mainly due to their inability to perform duties. 832 
Hence any move to obtain robots’ personality is arguably destined to be unsuccessful 833 
at this stage. Therefore we can conclude that robots are yet to be competent to have 834 
independent personality.  835 
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7. Conclusions 836 
The determination of personality in order to identify the subject of law is the foremost 837 
requirement of a legal solution to any dispute, because a law can be broken by its 838 
‘subjects’ alone. Levy, like many others, predicts that robots will be found in the 839 
majority of households by the end of the 21
st
 century (Weng et al. 2009). Meanwhile, 840 
robots are being used in their millions, and have already proved sometimes dangerous, 841 
causing significant amounts of harm. The personality of robots has thus been a critical 842 
concern for many countries around the world.  843 
The proponents of robots’ personality rely basically on the personhood of 844 
corporations, ignoring the fundamental consideration that corporate personality is 845 
essentially a symbol of people standing behind the entity. The rights and duties of a 846 
corporation resemble those of individuals who own and manage it, as alluded to 847 
earlier; this is where the justification for corporate personhood lies. On the other hand, 848 
the rationale for the recognition of idols’ personality is akin to that of corporations in 849 
that idols’ rights and duties are attended to by their managers or custodians, who are 850 
human beings. Thus robots are not comparable with either of these two recognised 851 
legal persons. Rather, these machines can be better compared to animals in terms, for 852 
instance, of so-called autonomy, self-awareness, or self-determination, though the 853 
latter may be more autonomous compared to the former; and they are different by 854 
nature – one is a human-made product, whilst the other is a living animal. However, 855 
they are again similar, as both of them are regarded as property and thus are mere 856 
‘objects’ of law, rather than ‘subjects’. Leenes and Lucivero (2014) reinforce that 857 
from legal perspective, robots are ‘treated as tools and it is always a human being that 858 
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is legally responsible for the robot’s actions and hence responsible for ensuring that 859 
they operate within the boundaries of the law.’ 860 
 861 
Autonomy and self-determination are not regarded as foundations of conferring legal 862 
rights on any entity (Stanley 2015). The NY-SCAD in Lavery reaffirmed that rights 863 
cannot be recognised in isolation from societal considerations, and thus granting legal 864 
rights has historically been attached to the imposition of social obligations and duties 865 
(Lavery 2014).
 
As a member of a society, everyone should be subject to rights and 866 
duties in order to live in an orderly manner. This subjection requires a being to have 867 
the capability of these two attributes. Principles of social contract thus warrant 868 
reciprocity between rights and duties (Lavery 2014, citations omitted). Pursuant to 869 
this view, rights of persons are recognised in exchange for an express or implicit 870 
agreement from them to submit to social duties (Lavery 2014).
 
A right is attached to 871 
moral agency and to the ability to shoulder social responsibility in exchange for that 872 
entitlement (Lavery 2014, citations omitted). According to Bryson (2010), ‘calling a 873 
robot a moral agent is not only false but an abrogation of our own responsibility’. 874 
 875 
The capability of rights and duties is therefore the sole attribute that is exclusively 876 
considered by courts in determining legal personality of any entities, in the absence of 877 
any succinct statutory provisions defining personality of any beings. Both 878 
chimpanzees and robots lack this critical attribute as demonstrated previously.  879 
Industrial and social robots have been empowered to do different types of acts for us. 880 
In doing their jobs, robots have already malfunctioned resulting in enormous harm. 881 
The machines might have gone beyond their programmed functions for some reason, 882 
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such as internal defects in manufacturing, or operational mistakes at some stage, or a 883 
plausible reason that could never be detected. In the event of not finding any fault or 884 
scientific reason for robots’ malfunction, the resultant harm should be redressed under 885 
a mandatory insurance system. Otherwise, we recommend that legal persons from 886 
either or both of the supply and user sides of the faulty robots be held liable for the 887 
harm in question, depending on the cause of their wrongful conduct and the 888 
corresponding involvement or fault of the legal persons (corporations and humans) in 889 
a given case. Nugenborg, comparing robots with pets, advocates owner’s liability 890 
(Weng et al. 2009; see also Leenes and Lucivero 2014), while others prefer 891 
manufacturers’ liability under the product liability regime (see Bertolini 2013). 892 
Liability is, for a rational being, an incentive, rather than a deterrent, in the sense that 893 
it inspires fear in wrongdoers, contributing to compliance with law and to the resultant 894 
prevention of harm (Allen 1931).
 
Granting legal personality to robots may not be a 895 
panacea; rather it may turn out to be Pandora’s box, if we transform the machines to 896 
our masters: as Smith (1928) commented, ‘[l]egal personality is a good servant, but it 897 
may be a bad master’. The robots’ personality could be that ‘bad master’, as recently 898 
Stephen Hawking, like many others, has given an alarming warning that artificial 899 
intelligence could end humankind (Cellan-Jones 2014). The personality in question 900 
may thus exacerbate the dangers by exonerating humans from liability and thereby 901 
diluting the effectiveness of deterrence. Moreover, robots do not as yet meet the 902 
requirements of personality, and we also need to think about the query and concerns 903 
expressed by Sartor (2009) in relation to robots: ‘Shall we delegate so much to them, 904 
and become so dependent on them that we will lose our ability to think and act on our 905 
own?’ In response, we may concur with Bryson’s view that ‘we are obliged not to the 906 
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robots, but to our society. We are obliged to educate consumers and producers alike to 907 
their real obligations with respect to robotics’ (Bryson 2010). 908 
 909 
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